Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) have been the focal point of research over the last several years. Broadcast communication is a key requirement for WSNs since many tasks in the network depend on broadcasting, including critical tasks like querying. Consequently, securing broadcast communication over sensor networks has become an important research challenge.
Introduction
Broadcasting has been one of the most important and widely used communication techniques for information dissemination, from heralding in ancient times to the current state-of-the-art communication networks. Broadcast communication, which forms the basis of all communication in wireless networks, operates in two phases: the broadcast phase and the acknowledgement phase, and is vulnerable to attacks during either or both of these phases. Intuitively, broadcast communication has two important metrics: security and reliability. Unlike reliability, which has drawn much attention from researchers, very few researchers have addressed the security metric [21] . In a one-to-all communication paradigm like broadcasting, where every broadcast originates from a single source, the only way for the source to ensure that all members have received the message is to have them acknowledge the message.
From the system perspective, having all of the nodes in a network acknowledge every single broadcast message is not a scalable solution. Particularly, in large scale networks like Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs), this increases the network load, causing a higher amount of collision and contention [2, 25] . Apparently, it becomes imperative to fine tune the detection threshold to accommodate appropriate levels of natural loss in the network. Otherwise, the system will be coaxed to raise false alarms. False alarms result in unnecessary system downtime as well as wasted resources by executing countermeasures on a network free of attacks. This is particulary detrimental in WSNs since the resources in WSNs are very scarce. The aforementioned problem has been addressed in [21] by using a technique called Secure Implicit Sampling (SIS) in which only a subset of nodes are randomly sampled to acknowledge each message broadcast. This alleviates the burden on the network to a large extent. We will discuss this method in further detail in Section 2. Traditionally, tree-based broadcasting has been considered to be highly unreliable over other techniques because a single malicious 1 node in the tree can block the message to the entire subtree rooted at it. The extent of damage caused in this scenario is a function of the size of the sub-tree rooted at the malicious node. Therefore the attacker can cripple a substantial portion of the network by compromising a single node with a large subtree. For this reason, fault tolerance has been a major concern in flooding tree-based broadcasting. This idea has been captured in Figure 2 (a), where the sensor network is represented as a graph and BS stands for base station. In the remainder of this paper, we will refer to static tree-based broadcasting as the Flooding Tree Model (FTM).
The aforementioned drawback of the FTM can be overcome by using blind flooding, in which each node rebroadcasts the message upon receiving it for the first time. This ensures very 1 The terms malicious and compromised are used interchangeably throughout this paper.
high reliability; that is, even in the presence of malicious nodes, every node receives the message unless there is a partitioning of the network. However, the fault tolerance of blind flooding comes at the cost of redundant transmissions that may cause a serious problem, referred to as the broadcast storm problem [3] . Retransmission increases communication congestion and contention in the network and wastes critical resources in WSNs. Hence, in light of the above discussions, an inevitable tradeoff between reliability and redundancy always exists.
However, we believe that using an FTM for broadcasting also has some hidden advantages from the system's perspective. The advantage is that when a large number of nodes are deprived of the broadcast message simultaneously, the attacker can be detected immediately. This is because the acknowledgement ratio computed by the base station, which is the ratio of the number of acknowledgements received to the number of acknowledgements expected, will be substantially small. The more nodes the adversary attempts to deny the broadcast message to, the greater the chances are that he will be detected. Even if the system attributes some fixed percentage of lost acknowledgements, say L%, to collision and contention in the network, it can still detect an attack with very high probability.
We draw our motivation from the above situation and propose a distributed k-parent Flooding Tree Model (k-FTM), which is robust against Denial-of-Broadcast-Message attacks (DoBM) 2 in WSNs. Our main motivation in proposing the k-FTM is to retain the high detection rate of FTM but at the same time achieve a reliability close to blind flooding with a reduced number of rebroadcasts.
When k = 1, k-FTM represents the basic FTM. FTM, k-FTM for k = 2, and blind flooding have been depicted in Figures 1 (a) , (b), and (c) respectively. In Figure 2 (g), which is a 2-FTM, the solid edges represent the first parent and the dashed edges represent the second parent of a node.
The dotted lines indicate the acknowledgement path.
In k-FTM, blind flooding is carried out once at the beginning, after node deployment, to construct the k-parent tree. Once constructed, all the subsequent message broadcasts and acknowledgements flow along the k-FTM. k-FTM is an excellent fault-tolerant model, and to our best knowledge, is the first fault-tolerant tree model to be applied for securing broadcast communica-2 A class of attack in which the adversary's primary motive is to deny the broadcast message to as many nodes as possible. In [21] , it is referred to as Denial-of-Message (DoM) attack. tion in WSNs. We will confirm via simulations that k-FTM strikes an optimal balance between the FTM and blind flooding. Our contributions in this paper can be summarized as follows:
1. We propose k-FTM, a novel distributed k-parent flooding tree model, that has a detection rate close to that of static tree-based broadcasting. k-FTM is the first tree model that achieves broadcast reliability close to that of blind flooding with reduced redundant rebroadcasts.
2. k-FTM is the first model to employ a reputation and trust-based framework for securing broadcast communication in WSNs. k-FTM is also the first fault-tolerant tree model for securing broadcast communication in WSNs.
3. We extend the model to include "Proactive acknowledgement" in order to enhance the model's detection rate.
We present algorithms for constructing the k-FTM.
We also analyze our model and evaluate it through simulations.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review relevant liter-atures. In Section 3 we discuss the proposed model in detail including a brief comparison with blind flooding, and discussions on the attacker model and underlying assumption. In Section 4, we discuss the two acknowledgement techniques, reactive and proactive, in detail. In Section 5, we present four different techniques that a node may use to select its k-parents, along with formal algorithms. In Section 6, we provide a detailed discussion on our model and shed light on its strengths and novelty. In Section 7, we describe our simulation environment and discuss the simulation results in detail. Finally, in Section 8 we conclude the paper with directions for future research.
Related Work
Though researchers have addressed the problem of energy-efficient and reliable broadcasting in wireless and sensor networks [1, 3, 7, 16, 17] , security issues have not been addressed adequately.
In [3] , Ni et al have discussed several drawbacks of the classical flooding algorithm, including energy consumption and reliability. They have also proposed several schemes to reduce redundant rebroadcasts. In [4, 7] , Lim and Kim show that finding an optimal flooding tree in an ad hoc wireless network is similar to the Minimum Connected Dominating Set (MCDS) problem and show the NP-completeness of the same.
In [8] the internal node based broadcasting algorithm is presented where it is assumed that each node has knowledge of the geographical coordinates as well as the degree of all its neighbors.
With this knowledge, it decides if a node is internal or not, and only internal nodes relay the broadcast message. Perrig et al. [11] present two building block security protocols optimized for use in sensor networks, SNEP and µTESLA. SNEP provides confidentiality, authentication, and freshness between nodes and the sink, while µTESLA provides authenticated broadcasts for severely resource-constrained environments.
McCune et al [21] have proposed Secure Implicit Sampling (SIS) for the detection of denial of message attacks on sensor network broadcasts. In SIS, using appropriate cryptographic functions and pseudo-random keys, the base station encrypts the message, in which it is encoded which nodes are required to acknowledge, and broadcasts it. The adversary has no way of knowing a priori the subset of nodes that will be sampled during each round. On receiving the message, each node authenticates the message and, if required, sends back an acknowledgement. In each round, on receiving the acknowledgements, the base station authenticates them and computes the acknowledgement ratio, which is the ratio of the received acknowledgements R i , to the number of expected acknowledgements S i . If this ratio is below a certain threshold h, i.e., R i S i < h, then the system raises an alarm.
Our k-FTM uses the aforementioned SIS technique as the underlying message encoding scheme to embed in the broadcast message as to which nodes are expected to acknowledge. k-FTM achieves better performance by integrating SIS with a reputation monitoring system. Note that, in [21] , the probability of the attacker remaining undetected varies with the location of the attacked node. It generally increases with the distance between the attacked node(s) and the base station. Therefore, when the acknowledgement from a geographically distant node is lost, there is a very high probability that the base station will attribute it to natural loss. Additionally, when fewer nodes are attacked, the probability of sampled nodes being blocked decreases and so does the probability of the attacker's detection. We thus advocate the use of k-FTM, which is more sensitive to attacks due to the topology in such scenarios. In our model, the probability of detection is not as sensitive as SIS to the physical distance of the node from the base station. Therefore, our model achieves a higher probability of detection compared to the model proposed in [21] .
For the sake of completeness, we shall discuss some of the state-of-the-art reputation monitoring systems. Numerous RTMSs, such as CORE [12] , RFSN [18] , and DRBTS [23] have been developed to stimulate node cooperation in MANETs and WSNs. In most of these models, nodes build their own view based on personal observations as well as the recommendations from neighbors. Michiardi and Molva proposed CORE [12] , which has a watchdog along with a reputation mechanism to distinguish between subjective, functional, and indirect reputation, all of which are weighted to get the combined reputation of a node. Here, nodes exchange only positive reputation information. The authors argue that this prevents badmouthing attacks. However, they do not address the issue of collusion of malicious nodes to create false praise. Another interesting feature of CORE is that its members have to contribute on a continual basis to remain trusted. Otherwise, their reputation will deteriorate until they are excluded.
Buchegger and Boudec [13] have presented CONFIDANT with predetermined trust, and later improved it with the Bayesian trust system and a passive acknowledge mechanism (PACK) respectively. This model makes misbehavior unattractive in MANETs based on selective altruism and utilitarianism. CONFIDANT is a distributed, symmetric reputation model which uses both first-hand and second-hand information for updating reputation values. Mundinger and Boudec [20] have presented a two-dimensional reputation system for protecting the system from liars to ensure cooperation and fairness in mobile ad-hoc networks.
Ganeriwal and Srivastava [18] proposed a reputation-based framework for sensor networks where nodes maintain reputation for other nodes and use it to evaluate their trustworthiness. They show that their framework provides a scalable, diverse and a generalized approach for countering all types of misbehavior resulting from malicious and faulty nodes.
k-FTM
In this section, we will first briefly discuss the differences between our model and blind flooding.
Then we delineate the attacker model and enlist some underlying assumptions of our model. We then discuss how k-FTM works in detail.
k-FTM vs Blind Flooding
Though blind flooding is one of the most preferred and reliable methods for achieving networkwide broadcast, it has a few drawbacks that can pose serious problems, particularly if a network uses blind flooding frequently. In this subsection we compare and contrast k-FTM with blind flooding.
In blind flooding, each node receives n copies of the same message, where n is the number of neighbors. In a dense network, this will result in very high redundancy. In k-FTM each node receives up to a maximum of k copies, one from each of its k-parents, and k can be as small as 2.
We do not address the situation where k = 1, since this is same as FTM.
In blind flooding, each node re-broadcasts the message upon receiving it for the first time.
So, in a network of N nodes, there will be N re-broadcasts. In k-FTM, only internal nodes rebroadcast the message on receiving it for the first time. So, in a network with N nodes of which M are leaf nodes, there will be only (N − M ) re-broadcasts. Therefore, in k-FTM, the number of rebroadcasts is reduced to the number of internal nodes. This results in substantial savings of communication bandwidth as well as energy for non-broadcasting nodes. For example, in Figure 2 This reduces the number of re-broadcasts by 30% compared to blind flooding. Note that k is a tunable parameter. Therefore, the redundancy can be varied depending on the application domain as well as the associated security and reliability requirements.
Attacker Model
The attacker's sole motive is to block each broadcast message to as many nodes in the network as possible. The attacker can potentially attack the broadcast communication either during the broadcast phase or the acknowledgement phase. However, the impact of the attack on the network and the adversary differs dramatically for these two phases. By attacking during the broadcast phase, the attacker is blocking the message from reaching the nodes, which is a serious threat since the base station cannot communicate the message to all the nodes. The number of nodes deprived of the message depends on the degree of the attacked node in the k-parent tree. The degree of a node i in the k-parent tree is a measure of the number of children the node has, which is denoted
On the otherhand, by attacking during the acknowledgement phase, the attacker is merely increasing the false alarm rate since the message would have already been delivered to the nodes. This is not as serious as the previous situation and could be referred to as "False negative". This does not benefit the attacker since it only increases the probability of his detection. Hence, the attacker only attacks during the broadcast phase. There may be other attacker models in which the adversary may attack during the acknowledgement phase and cause the system to panic or to rebroadcast the message multiple times, consuming precious network resources, but we do not address such attacks in this paper.
In addition, we assume that in k-FTM the adversary will not attack during the initial tree setup phase. This follows from a straight forward logic as follows. By attacking during the initial tree setup phase and blocking the message to as many nodes as possible, the adversary will end up being a non-broadcasting node. Consequently, during the subsequent actual message broadcast rounds, the adversary will not be able to induce any damage. This is counterproductive for the adversary and in contradiction with his motive.
We assume that the attacker is external to the network and randomly chooses nodes and compromises them. He cannot compromise the base station, and can never restore a compromised node to its original configuration. Compromised nodes attack by not forwarding the message to their children and selective forwarding is not permitted in k-FTM. The attacker is not aware of the network topology which makes it more difficult for him to choose nodes for launching his attack.
We consider only non-forwarding attacks in a dense static network. When sampled, a compromised node promptly acknowledges and never drops the acknowledgements of other nodes. We assume that there is a secure key-management protocol to establish pair-wise keys between each node and the base station. Each node encrypts its acknowledgement using the pairwise key it shares with the base station. Hence, compromised nodes cannot inject fabricated acknowledgements. We also assume that compromised nodes do not collaborate. Nodes have uniform transmission ranges and the rate of message propagation is uniform. Finally, we assume that there is an appropriate back-off timer to resolve contention/congestion related issues.
k-FTM-Model Description
In k-FTM, after node deployment, the base station carries out an initial round of flooding with a Hello message after network initialization as presented in Algorithm 1. Upon receiving the Hello message for the first time, every node rebroadcasts it. After rebroadcasting, nodes wait until List to keep track of its parents, i.e., the nodes to whom it has acknowledged as child and stores their IDs. Note that a node can choose its k-parents using several different methods, which we will discuss in detail in Section 5. We have relaxed the k-parent constraint on nodes that are within the communication range of the base station since they are assured of message delivery. Algorithm 2 formally presents the process of updating the P List and the C List .
Once a node establishes all k-parents and T ime ACK out occurs, it sends a copy of its P List and C List to the base station. At the end of the tree construction phase, the base station will have a copy of P List and C List of every node in the network. The base station then carries out a simple sanity check to ensure nodes are not faking their lists. The sanity check is performed as follows: if node A claims to be the parent of node B, then node B should have claimed itself as the child of node A. With a single such inconsistency, it may be difficult for the base station to determine which of the two nodes is lying. However, since we are assuming that there is no collaboration among malicious nodes, two such inconsistencies for a single node will flag it as malicious. If a node has faked its list, it is immediately blacklisted. This completes the construction of the k-FTM. During subsequent broadcast rounds, nodes accept messages only from nodes in their P List and C List .
After the initial k-FTM construction, the reputation and trust-based system comes into action. In our model, each node is equipped with a watchdog that monitors its neighborhood. Neighborhood of a node i is the set of all nodes that are in i's communication range. In our model we shall restrict the neighborhood of a node i to its parents (P i List ) and children (C i List ), which we will discuss later. Consequently, using the feedback from watchdog, each node assigns a reputation value to nodes in its P List and C List . The reputation value that a node i has assigned to its neighbor node j at time t is represented as R t i,j . We will use this reputation monitoring system as the underlying framework in our model. When a node is sampled, it includes the reputation value of nodes in its neighborhood in the acknowledgement. With the watchdog-driven reputation monitoring system, a node can report on the forwarding behavior of its children as well.
Using k-FTM has a two-fold benefit from the system's perspective. First, the attacker's malicious intentions are thwarted, since the message is delivered to the otherwise blocked nodes in FTM by at least one of the k parents, assuming each node has at least one benign parent, i.e., a node can have at most (k − 1) malicious parents. Suppose a node has n nodes in its neighborhood, then it can have no more than n − 1 malicious nodes in its neighborhood to ensure that it has at least one benign parent. Second, the attacker is very likely to be detected immediately since a compromised node's child nodes, if sampled, report to the base station on failing to receive k copies of the message. Note that a malicious node's parents can also report on its non-forwarding behavior monitored by the watchdog.
When the base station has to broadcast a message, it encodes in the message which nodes are expected to acknowledge using the SIS technique. The subset of nodes selected to acknowledge each broadcast message is probabilistically chosen, which makes it completely unpredictable and extremely hard for the adversary to determine which nodes are being sampled for any given round. On receiving the message, nodes decrypt the message to determine if they are expected to acknowledge. If so, then they send back an acknowledgement. Two methods exist for a node i to choose one or more nodes among its k-parents to send the acknowledgement to. In the first method, i randomly chooses one or more parents to send the acknowledgement to. The number of parents it chooses to send the acknowledgement to is a function of permissible redundancy. In the second method, i uses the accumulated reputation value and chooses one or more parent nodes to send the acknowledgement, in decreasing order of reputation value. Note that, for any given message, if node i does not receive a copy of the message from its parent j, then i automatically excludes j when an acknowledgement has to be sent. The above strategy of choosing parents to send acknowledgements to also applies to intermediate nodes that are not sampled to acknowledge but have to forward the acknowledgement of a descendant node.
The acknowledging process itself can be divided into two groups: reactive acknowledgement and proactive acknowledgement. We shall first discuss the process of acknowledgement in general before comparing and contrasting the two. The acknowledgement of a node is a k-field list with one field assigned to each parent which has two pieces of information. The first piece of information indicates whether the corresponding parent forwarded the message during the current round and the second piece of information is the accumulated reputation value of the corresponding parent node. A binary 1 is used to indicate if the corresponding parent forwarded the message and 0 is used otherwise. Similar lists can be used by a node to report on the forwarding/non-forwarding behavior of its children. To control redundancy, the base station can additionally indicate in the message whether the sampled node has to report on its parents only or on both parents and children.
For the sake of completeness, we shall now briefly discuss the reputation monitoring system, reputation update, and distribution. Every node maintains a reputation value for each of its parent and child nodes using the reputation monitoring system. The reputation value is a continuous value and is range bound between 0 and 1. The reputation value of a parent node is computed as follows, with j as the parent node and i as the monitoring child.
Similarly, the reputation of a child node is computed as follows, with l as the child and i as the monitoring parent:
In Equation 
Acknowledgement Techniques
In this section, we will discuss the two acknowledgement techniques, reactive and proactive, presented in Algorithm 3, in detail, delineating their merits and differences. The acknowledgement of a node indicates how many copies of the message it received and which parents failed to forward.
It can also indicate how many of the child nodes further forwarded the message successfully.
Reactive Acknowledgement
In the reactive acknowledgement scheme, only nodes that are sampled by the system send back an acknowledgement. The set of nodes sampled to acknowledge each broadcast message is unique and determined probabilistically using the SIS technique proposed in [21] . The reactive acknowledgement scheme is very effective in curtailing network traffic since only a subset of nodes acknowledge. Note that in the reactive acknowledgement scheme, the same node may not be sam- Report to base station; 4: end if 5: end for pled to acknowledge for a long time. Hence, it records both the malicious and benign behavior of nodes in the reputation metric, and reports it to the base station when sampled.
When the base station fails to receive acknowledgement from node i that is sampled for a particular round, it first determines node i's parents using P i List . Then it checks the received acknowledgements to see if any of the sampled nodes have common parent(s) with i, against whom they have reported, i.e., reported against node(s) in P i List . If there are no reports, then it is very likely that the node has either failed or the acknowledgement has been lost enroute due to contention/collision. Note that nodes cannot inject spoofed ACKs in reactive acknowledgement because only sampled nodes send ACK and the adversary has no information ahead of time as to which nodes will be sampled for a particular round.
Proactive Acknowledgement
In the proactive acknowledgement scheme, every node that receives fewer than k copies of the message, one from each of its k parents, sends back an acknowledgement to the base station informing it about the incident.
The proactive acknowledgement scheme overcomes the drawbacks of the reactive acknowledgement scheme effectively in two scenarios: (1) In case a sampled node is blocked by all its parents and no other sample node happens to share a common parent with the attacked node, the base station is going to ignore the attack (this situation will not arise in our simulations since we are assuming that each node has at least one benign parent), and (2) in case a non-sampled node is attacked, the base station will never be informed about it and therefore the attack goes unnoticed.
Consequently, the attacker continues to survive in the network with the potential to damage the system further.
Proactive acknowledgement provides the base station with ample evidence, helping it in detecting the attacks almost every single time with greater confidence and certainty. It also enables the base station to ball park the malicious node more accurately. However, the traffic overhead and collision incurred in proactive acknowledgement approaches that of blind flooding. Nonetheless, by adjusting the threshold on the number of copies needed to report via proactive acknowledgement, T H ack pro rep , the traffic overhead and collision can be controlled. For illustration, consider a k-FTM with k = 5. In this tree, if T H ack pro rep = 3, then a node will send a report in the proactive acknowledgement scheme only if the number of message copies received is less than 3. Note that in proactive acknowledgement, the adversary can spoof acknowledgements only from captured nodes over which it has full control and thus can access all the information stored in that node. It cannot spoof the ACK of a benign node for two reasons: 1) it does not have access to the key shared by a benign node with the base station and 2) it does not know if the benign node has received less than
T H
ack pro rep copies of the message.
Parent Selection Methods
Below are three different methods for choosing the k parents during k-FTM construction such that the system throughput is maximized while keeping the detection rate as high as possible. We present formal algorithms for these methods and discuss them in the remainder of this section. The first method is called the Fastest First k-parents. In this method, a node acknowledges as child to the first k nodes from which it receives the Hello message. This method has been formally presented in Algorithm 4. This is the simplest of the three methods proposed and has the least overhead.
The second method is called the Disjoint Path k-parents. In this method, a node receives while parent count i < k do 5: for (message) received from each neighbor j do 6: if message is fresh then 7: rebroadcast (message); 8: end if
9:
U pdate P List (i, j); 10: parent count i + +;
11:
U pdate C List (j, i); 12: end for 13: end while 14: end for a Hello message from all its neighbors along with path label until T ime msg out occurs. path label is a list of IDs of nodes through which the message has passed starting from the base station.
Nodes that broadcast the message after T ime msg out are ignored during the parent selection process. A node, while choosing its k-parents, chooses nodes with disjoint path label. The advantage of this method is that it augments system throughput significantly. However, a node may encounter a situation wherein it may not find all k parents with a disjoint path label. Under this circumstance, assuming that a node finds only m out of k parents with a disjoint path, it chooses the remaining (k −m) parents according to a first-come-first-served principle. Algorithm 5 formally presents this method. After choosing the k-parents, a node appends its ID to k unique path label received from the selected k-parents and then rebroadcasts it along with the message. Figure 1 (d) is an example of a 2-FTM where each node has 2 parents with disjoint paths to the base station. This method has a larger overhead in terms of both storage and communication. To reduce this overhead, we can have a node rebroadcast the message by appending its ID to only one unique path label from one of its parent's. This improved method is called the Improved Disjoint Path k-parents. In this paper, due to space limitations, we shall not discuss it further but we will look into it in our future work. while T ime msg out has not occured do 4: for (message, path label) received from each neighbor j do 5: if message is fresh then 6: Put (message, path label) in buffer; 7: else 8: Put path labels in buffer; 9: end if 10: end for 11: end while 12: Choose max available parents with disjoint path label; 13: Choose remaining parents on FCFS basis; 14: add all k-parents to P i List ; 15: for each parent j selected do
16:
U pdate C List (j, i);
17:
F lag j State ← broadcasting; 18: end for
19:
Append ID to k unique path labels received from the k-parents and rebroadcast along with message; 20: end for node cannot find all k-parents with unique level-1 ancestors, then it reverts to the first-come-firstserved principle as explained before. Every node rebroadcasts the message along with the ID of the level-1 ancestor.
Discussion
The adversary's strategy changes with his motive and the degree of his conservativeness. He can be either extremely aggressive, inducing maximum damage over a short period of time, and get caught, or, he can be very prudent, inducing minimal damage during each broadcast round, and remain undetected for extended periods of time. An adversary can choose to vary his strategy by varying his aggressiveness between the above two extremes. At all times, the adversary solely strives to maximize his reward, measured as the extent of damage caused to the system, by balancing the tradeoff between his aggressiveness and his expected survival time. The system, on the other hand, always aims at maximizing its performance with high detection rate by thwarting the adversary's attempt before he induces irreparable damage to the network. However, there is an inevitable tradeoff between good performance and a high detection rate.
Good performance often comes at the cost of high communication overhead, high memory usage, and low detection rate. By opting to maximize the reliability, the system allows malicious nodes to persist in the network. This is because when reliability is the requirement, blind flooding suits best since the chances of every node receiving the message, even in the presence of malicious nodes, is very high due to redundant re-broadcasts. On the other hand, when a high detection rate is the requirement, FTM suits best. By using FTM to achieve a high detection rate, the system sacrifices its performance, since a single malicious node with a large subtree can cripple a substantial portion of the network. However, the proposed k-FTM, ∀k > 1, strikes an optimal balance between blind flooding and FTM, by retaining a reliability close to blind flooding and a detection rate close to FTM.
In a network with n nodes, each node has a uniform probability of 1 n for being sampled.
If sampled nodes are blocked by the compromised nodes, then they fail to receive the broadcast message. Consequently, the base station will fail to receive their ACK. In an ideal-world situation where there is no natural loss, the base station will attribute this loss to DoBM. But in a real-world scenario, where there is natural loss, the base station may attribute this loss to either natural loss or DoBM depending on various factors like network load, permissible natural loss in the network, etc. As k increases, our model approaches blind flooding and ensures a definite coverage. But at the same time the number of redundant rebroadcasts increase since, with an increase in k, the number of non-broadcasting nodes decreases. We confirm this through simulation and the results are presented in Figure 6 (a).
The number of children a node i can have is upper bound by m − k, where m is the number of nodes in the neighborhood of i and k is the number of parents i has to have. Also, for a node with m neighbors, it is stable up to (m − 1) malicious nodes provided only (k − 1) parents are chosen from the (m − 1) malicious nodes and 1 parent is the benign node in the neighborhood.
For illustration consider Figure 3, which is a 2-FTM. Let nodes 3, 6, 8 , and 10 be the sampled nodes (30% sampling) in all three scenarios. Now, following are the different scenarios from the point of view of a malicious node. A malicious node itself can be denied the message from one of its parents which is also a malicious node. In this scenario, as shown in Figure 3 (a) , though node 6 is malicious, it only gets one copy of the message from node 3. Node 2, which is also malicious, blocks the message to both 5 and 6. Node 6 further blocks the message to nodes 8 and 9. However, nodes 8 and 9 get a copy of the message from nodes 5 and 7 respectively. Finally, node 9 blocks the message to node 10, which gets a copy of the message from node 8. Now, during the acknowledgement phase, the sampled nodes 3, 6, 8, and 10 report the following: 3 has no reports (assuming it received both copies of the message), 6 reports on 2, 8 reports on 6, and 10 reports on 9. In this scenario, even if node 9 were to be sampled and even if it did report on 6, it would be caught with node 10's report since, there was no reason for 9 to block the message to 10 when it got the message from node 7. Assuming 9 did not get a copy of the message from either parents, then there was no way that 9 could have guessed the existence of the message and acknowledged it.
There is another possibility here. If nodes 6 and 9 are collaborating, then node 9 can report against node 7 instead of node 6. Now, since node 9 is the only child of node 7, the base station does not have enough evidence to punish node 9. Also, now the number of reports against node 6 will be one short, making it further ambiguous for the base station to take a decision. Hence, the simple majority decision rule (SMDR) is useful in such a situation. If at least half the number of children of a node have reported against it, then the node will be treated as misbehaving and accordingly punished. This again opens up the possibility of bad-mouthing attacks. In a 2-FTM, a node can simply report against one of its parents randomly, and since it satisfies the requirement to apply the SMDR, a benign parent node can get punished. Such attacks can be overcome with the base station querying the parents of a reported node to check if the node forwarded the mes-sage. Since selective forwarding is not permitted, if the parent nodes confirm that the node indeed forwarded the message, then the base station can take decisions with higher confidence. Note that in a collaboration free environment, i.e., when no malicious nodes collaborate, then the number of reports against a malicious node i in the acknowledgement phase will be equal to |C i List |.
In the scenario presented in Figure 3 (b) , the message is blocked to node 6 by both its parents.
Consequently, during acknowledgement phase, node 3 reports normal, node 6 does not acknowledge, node 8 reports against node 6, and node 10 reports against node 9. Similarly, for the scenario presented in Figure 3 (c) , during acknowledgement phase, node 3 reports normal, node 6 reports normal, node 8 reports normal, and node 10 reports against node 8.
The base station reconstructs the tree T ime T ree out occurs. Prior to the reconstruction, the base station broadcasts a message informing nodes about the malicious node(s) so that they don't choose the malicious node(s) as one of their parents when k-FTM is reconstructed. There is a possibility that the warning message itself may be denied to nodes. However, this is not a major threat since nodes in the current tree have kept track of the forwarding/non-forwarding behavior of their neighborhood using the reputation system. The main purpose of broadcasting this message is to warn those nodes that are in the vicinity of a malicious node but are not its parent or child in the current k-parent tree. These nodes are highly vulnerable to becoming the child node of such malicious nodes in the reconstructed tree by virtue of their locality. By broadcasting a warning message, the malicious node is forced to be either a non-broadcasting node or at best a node with a very small sub-tree rooted at it.
Rebuilding the tree based on T ime T ree out has a two fold advantage. First, it prevents a dormant adversary from getting familiar with the locality, thereby curtailing the damage it can cause in the future. Second, it ensures that nodes are moved around providing all nodes a fair chance of being both a broadcasting and a non-broadcasting node. On the other hand, rebuilding the tree when the malicious behavior exceeds a predetermined threshold renders a compromised node as a non-broadcasting node or at least tapers its node degree such that only a small subtree is rooted at it in the new k-FTM. This curtails the damage the adversary can cause in the subsequent message broadcast rounds.
Simulation and Results
In this section, we discuss the simulation environment used in our simulations followed by a detailed discussion on the result obtained.
Environment and Setup
Our simulations have been carried out on a custom JAVA simulator for proof-of-concept evaluation of our protocol without concerning lower-layer details such as packet contention and collision. In 
Results
In this section we shall use S, M , N , R, and ACK to denote the percentage of sampled nodes, the percentage of malicious nodes, the total number of nodes in the network, the node transmission range, and the acknowledgement type.
In Figure 4 (a), we have presented the results for total number of nodes actually receiving the broadcast message, i.e., throughput, in a FTM with varying percentages of malicious nodes.
We can see that the throughput decreases steadily as the percentage of malicious nodes in the In Figure 5 (a), we have presented results comparing the system throughput in a k-FTM, with k = 2, by varying R from 40m to 100m in steps of 20m. The system performs best with a 100m range. However, at 100m the energy consumption will also be higher. We can see that it achieves good throughput even at lower values of R. In this graph we can see that k-FTM achieves an average throughput of about 87% for k = 2.
In Figure 5 (b), we have plotted the results comparing probability of detection of FTM, k-FTM, and SIS [21] . Probability of detection has been plotted against percentage of deprived nodes. From the graph, it is very clear that both FTM and k-FTM outperform SIS. Though the performance of these models converge, the difference in their performance with fewer percentage of nodes deprived is significant. The results are in confirmation with our discussion at the end of Section 2.
In Figure 6 (a), we have plotted the percentage of non-broadcasting nodes against total number of nodes, for our k-FTM varying k from 1 to 5 in increments of 1. We can see that as k increases, the percentage of non-broadcasting nodes decreases. This clearly indicates that with increasing k, k-FTM tends to approach the performance of blind flooding in terms of traffic overhead and redundancy. Note that, for a given k, the percentage of non-broadcasting nodes marginally increases with increasing density.
In Figure 6 (b), we have compared the number of reports received at the base station under different scenarios using proactive acknowledgement. We have considered a 5-FTM of 1, 000
nodes with 60m transmission range and 10% malicious nodes. We have studied the extent to which redundancy can be controlled by varying T H ack pro rep from 2 to 5. When sampled nodes are asked to report on receiving fewer than 2 copies of the broadcast message, the base station receives a maximum of 5 reports. This number increases with the number of copies expected. It also increases with increasing density. We can see that when sampled nodes are asked to report if they fail to receive fewer than 5 copies, about 135 reports are received.
In Figure 6 (c), we have compared the performance of different methods for constructing the k-FTM with k = 3, with 80m transmission range and 10% malicious nodes. We see that Disjoint Path k-parents and Improved Disjoint Path k-parents have almost the same performance and achieve the best coverage. In Figure 6 (d), we have plotted the acknowledgement ratio for FTM and k-FTM with k varied from 1 to 5 in steps of 1. We see that FTM has the lowest acknowledge-ment ratio followed by 2-FTM, 3-FTM, 4-FTM, and 5-FTM. The acknowledgement ratio tends to increase with increase in k but decreases with increasing M .
Conclusion
We have proposed k-FTM, a novel distributed k-parent Flooding Tree Model that efficiently addresses both reliability and security metrics of broadcasting in wireless sensor networks (WSNs).
It can be easily adapted to other networks. k-FTM is very robust and efficient in detecting Denialof-Broadcast-Message attacks and to our best knowledge, it is the first fault tolerant tree model.
k-FTM is also the first model to employ a reputation and trust-based framework for secure and reliable broadcasting in WSNs. Our model has reliability close to blind flooding and a detection rate close to a static tree. We have presented various methods, with algorithms, for constructing k-FTM. We have also proposed two different acknowledgement techniques with different redundancy and detection rates. Simulation studies have been conducted to evaluate the applicability of the model and results have been promising. In our future work, we would like to investigate the following: (1) use of directional antennas instead of omni-directional antennas to mitigate energy consumption, (2) correlation between network topology and various attacks on WSN communication, (3) relax the constraint permitting collaboration among malicious nodes and study its impact on network throughput, and (4) conduct a in-depth simulation of the protocol on NS-2.
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